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I.  AN UNSUSTAINABLE SYSTEM 
In February 2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 
which adjudicates appeals from the immigration courts of the United 
States, was broken and badly in need of repair.1 The most obvious 
problem was a backlog of more than fifty-seven thousand pending 
cases—a number that had been steadily growing for more than a 
decade. Of those pending cases, more than thirty-eight thousand were 
over a year old. And more than thirteen thousand cases were over 
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 1. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is part of the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review, which is a component of the Department of Justice. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.0(a) 
(2008). Members of the BIA are executive branch officials whose decisions ultimately speak for 
the Department of Justice. The BIA has nationwide jurisdiction to review both immigration 
judges’ decisions and some decisions made by district directors of the Department of Homeland 
Security. The BIA is “the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration 
laws,” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration 
Appeals, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2009), subject to review by 
the attorney general, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, BOARD OF 
IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 11 (2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/ 
qapracmanual/pracmanual/chap1.pdf. The attorney general has the authority to assign BIA 
cases to himself and to overrule BIA decisions that deviate from the executive branch’s 
interpretation of immigration law. Id. 
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three years old. Even worse, a significant number of cases were over 
five years old.2 
Such a massive case backlog severely impaired the rule of law in 
immigration and defeated the objective of timely and efficient 
adjudication of appeals. The backlog also gave opportunistic 
immigration lawyers an incentive to file frivolous appeals in which the 
aliens had no valid argument. Even though they knew their clients 
could not win, such lawyers could exploit the bottleneck in the system 
to guarantee their clients additional years within the United States. 
A second problem, which was the chief cause of the first, was the 
method of adjudicating appeals. Until 1999, three-member panels 
reviewed all cases, even cases that presented no colorable basis for 
appeal.3 This resulted in a colossal diversion of public resources to 
cases that did not merit the attention and coordination of three BIA 
members. In 1999, the Clinton Justice Department implemented a 
limited streamlining initiative to address the problem. That initiative 
allowed certain categories of appeals to be adjudicated by a single 
member rather than a three-member panel. The 1999 initiative was 
reviewed favorably by an external auditor in 2001. It had resulted in 
an approximately 50 percent increase in overall BIA productivity in 
fiscal year 2001.4 The BIA reforms of 2002, described below, would 
build upon that success and focus the time and resources of three-
member panels on cases that warranted this expenditure of public 
resources. 
A third problem was the standard of review that the BIA 
routinely applied in reconsidering factual determinations made by 
immigration judges. Unlike Article III courts of appeals, the BIA was 
revisiting de novo the factual determinations made in the immigration 
courts below.5 Instead of deferring to the factual findings of an 
immigration judge who had the benefit of live testimony to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, the BIA would make factual findings anew 
without appropriate deference to the court below. It is a well-settled 
 
 2. In February 2002, the number of pending cases before the Board of Immigration 
Appeals was 57,949. Of these, 38,843 were more than a year old, and 13,707 were more than 
three years old. This information comes from Department of Justice statistics that are in the 
possession of the authors. 
 3. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,879 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 4. See id. (referencing the external audit). The Board decided 31,789 cases in FY 2001, id. 
at 54,878. Of those, 15,372 cases were decided under the streamlined procedures. Id. at 54,875. 
 5. See id. at 54,888 (eliminating de novo review of fact finding). 
ASHCROFT IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:49:56 AM 
2009] IMMIGRATION REFORM 1993 
principle that courts of appeals do not lightly reopen the factual 
findings of the trial courts below. Reading a cold transcript long after 
the trial, appellate courts are too far removed from the evidence to 
evaluate it accurately. Therefore, appellate courts normally disrupt 
the factual findings of trial courts only when the findings rise to the 
level of being “clearly erroneous.” 
De novo review of factual findings is especially inappropriate in 
the immigration court context. Most immigration cases involve a 
sparse paper record and very few corroborating witnesses or none at 
all. Often the only live testimony is provided by the alien himself. In 
asylum cases, for example, there are rarely, if ever, corroborating 
witnesses testifying about specific threats to the alien in the alien’s 
country of origin. General country condition reports from the State 
Department may be presented, but they leave many specific questions 
unanswered. The most salient evidence of a “well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion,” which is the central 
requirement for the granting of asylum,6 is usually the testimony of 
the alien himself. Thus, if the system is to render a correct judgment, 
an accurate evaluation of the alien’s credibility is essential. Only the 
immigration judge has the opportunity to look the alien in the eye to 
assess his or her credibility. An immigration judge will often question 
an alien directly if gaps or inconsistencies in the individual’s story 
emerge. By engaging in de novo review of factual findings on appeal, 
the BIA was giving aliens two bites at the apple—two opportunities 
to present their facts. And the higher court was in a worse position to 
make an accurate factual judgment. This odd appellate procedure 
called into question the correctness of many of the factual findings 
that the BIA offered. 
In short, the BIA had reached a crisis point by 2002. The backlog 
was out of control. Justice was being delayed, creating a perverse 
incentive to appeal meritless cases. Public resources were being 
squandered in these cases through the inefficient use of three-
member panels. And the BIA was calling into question its own 
decisionmaking by engaging in ad hoc factual inquiries under the 
inappropriate de novo standard. Reform was required. 
 
 6. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
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II.  THE 2002 BIA REFORMS 
On February 6, 2002, the Department of Justice announced a 
package of sweeping reforms of the BIA.7 The department’s 
objectives were to eliminate the case backlog gradually, apply the 
appellate practices and standards of Article III courts to the BIA, 
focus the resources of three-member panels on those cases that 
needed them the most, prevent unwarranted delays, and enhance the 
quality of BIA decisionmaking.8 All of this would be done while 
ensuring that due process would be provided in every case. The 
proposed rule implementing these reforms was promulgated on 
February 19, 2002,9 and the final rule was promulgated on August 26, 
2002.10 The elements of the 2002 reforms were as follows. 
(1) Instead of automatically going to a three-member panel of 
the BIA, all cases would go first to a screening panel, where a single 
member would either decide the case or determine that it was 
appropriate for three-member panel review.11 Instead of squandering 
the time and attention of three-member panels on cases that were 
relatively simple, the BIA would be able to focus those resources on 
cases in which searching appellate review was most needed.12 Three-
member panels would be used in six situations: 
(a) to settle inconsistencies between the rulings of different 
immigration judges, 
(b) to resolve ambiguities in the immigration laws, 
(c) to decide appeals involving matters of national importance, 
(d) to correct decisions that are plainly not in conformity with 
the law,  
(e) to correct factual determinations that appear to be clearly 
erroneous, and 
 
 7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Unveils Administrative 
Rule Change to Board of Immigration Appeals in Order to Eliminate Massive Backlog of More 
than 56,000 Cases (Feb. 6, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/February/ 
02_ag_063.htm. 
 8. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 7309, 7309–10 (proposed Feb. 19, 2002) (describing the objectives of 
the rule changes). 
 9. Id. at 7309–18. 
 10. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. at 54,878–905. 
 11. Id. at 54,880. 
 12. Id. 
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(f) to reverse the decision of an immigration judge or the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, other than a 
reversal under sec. 3.1(e)(5).13 
All aliens would retain their right to appeal any board decision to 
the appropriate U.S. court of appeals.14 
(2) The reforms eliminated the BIA’s de novo review of factual 
issues. The BIA would accept the factual findings of the immigration 
judges, disturbing them only if they were “clearly erroneous”15—
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suspending the time limits described above.23 The BIA was also 
directed to assign priority to cases involving detained persons, 
ensuring that those individuals have their cases resolved without 
delay.24 In addition, the chairman of the BIA was directed to establish 
a case management system for the expeditious resolution of all 
appeals.25 Cases would no longer sit idle before the BIA for several 
years. 
(4) The reforms restored a regulatory provision that allowed the 
BIA to summarily dismiss an appeal that is filed for an improper 
purpose, such as to cause unnecessary delay.26 
(5) Jurisdiction over appeals of Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (now Immigration and Customs Enforcement) decisions 
imposing administrative fines were transferred from the BIA to the 
Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO).27 
In addition to these procedural reforms, the Department of 
Justice modified the size of the BIA to eleven members.28 Beginning 
in 1995, the department had incrementally increased the number of 
BIA members from five to twenty-three.29 This expansion of the 
board, however, did not speed up the completion of decisions. 
Rather, the backlog of cases only grew larger.30 It was plain that the 
backlog was not a personnel problem; it was fundamentally a problem 
of procedure. In 2006, the department modified the size of the BIA 
once again, changing it to a fifteen-member body.31 This Article will 
not focus on the fluctuating size of the BIA, which does not trigger 
 
 23. Id. at 54,902. 
 24. See id. at 54,896 (“The Department also believes that 8 CFR 3.1(e)(8) sufficiently 
directs the Board to assign priority to deciding case appeals involving detained respondents.”). 
 25. Id. at 54,903. 
 26. Id. at 54,902. 
 27. See id. at 54,900 (stating that this issue will be addressed in a separate final ruling). 
 28. Id. at 54,901. At the time the 2002 BIA reforms were announced, the number of BIA 
positions was twenty-three, with nineteen positions filled and four vacancies. Id. at 54,878. On 
April 18, 2003, the board was reduced to eleven members after a 180-day transition period as 
directed by the regulations. See id. at 54,901 (stating that the reduction should occur within six 
months of the implementation of the screening system). Normal attrition had reduced the board 
to sixteen members, and the remaining five were reassigned to vacancies in Executive Office of 
Immigration Review. 
 29. Id. at 54,878. 
 30. See Kris W. Kobach, Courting Chaos: Senate Proposal Undermines Immigration Law, 
HERITAGE RESEARCH (Heritage Found., WebMemo No. 1083, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/ 
Research/Immigration/wm1083.cfm. 
 31. See Memorandum from U.S. Att’y Gen. to the Deputy Att’y Gen. et al. (Aug. 9, 2006), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ag-080906.pdf. 
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any colorable due process claims and was not central to the 2002 BIA 
reforms. Rather, this Article will consider the various procedural 
issues presented by the reforms, and subsequent judicial review of 
those reforms. 
The 2002 BIA reforms are often associated with an increase in 
BIA cases that are “affirmed without opinion” (AWO). In such a 
decision, which is rendered by a single member, the following 
boilerplate language must be used: “The Board affirms, without 
opinion, the result of the decision below. The decision is, therefore, 
the final agency determination.”32 The decision to affirm without 
opinion “approves the result reached in the decision below,” but 
“does not necessarily imply approval of all of the reasoning of that 
decision.”33 An affirmance without opinion, however, does “signify 
the Board’s conclusion that any errors in the [immigration judge’s] 
decision . . . were harmless or immaterial.”34 
Although the use of the AWO did increase because the 
percentage of BIA cases decided by single members increased after 
2002, the 2002 BIA reforms neither mandated this result nor created 
the AWO. Indeed, the AWO was introduced in the 1999 streamlining 
reforms, which gave the chairman of the BIA authority to designate 
categories of cases that would be decided by single members, but 
mandated that all single-member decisions be affirmances without 
opinion.35 In fiscal year 2001, over 58 percent of BIA cases were 
decided by single members who affirmed without opinion.36 The 2002 
BIA reforms actually removed the 1999 requirement that a single-
member decision be an AWO and provided that, “[i]f the Board 
member to whom an appeal is assigned determines, upon 
consideration of the merits, that the decision is not appropriate for 
affirmance without opinion, the Board member shall issue a brief 
order affirming, modifying, or remanding the decision under 
review.”37 The 2002 BIA reforms also gave single members deciding 
cases the option to “reverse the decision under review if such reversal 
is plainly consistent with and required by intervening Board or 
 
 32. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (2008). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals: 
Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135, 56,141 (Oct. 18, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 36. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,879 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 37. Id. at 54,903 (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5)). 
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judicial precedent, by an intervening Act of Congress, or by an 
intervening final regulation.”38 
Thus, for the first time, the 2002 reforms provided single 
members deciding cases with multiple options in addition to the 
AWO. It is therefore incorrect to assert, as one observer has, that the 
2002 BIA reforms “encourag[ed] routine ‘affirmances without 
opinion.’”39 On the contrary, the issuance of an AWO became less 
routine and more discretionary. It is also true, however, that an 
increase in AWO opinions was a foreseeable result of the 2002 BIA 
reforms. The total number of AWO opinions per year increased as 
the 2002 BIA reforms allocated a larger share of the board’s cases to 
single-member decisions.40 Accordingly, this Article will consider the 
use of the AWO and its impact within the larger context of the 1999 
and 2002 BIA reforms. 
The 2002 BIA reforms had an immediate and significant impact 
on the efficiency of the BIA. After the reforms were implemented, 
the board was able to complete a far higher number of cases per 
month, more than keeping up with its workload. The following figures 
illustrate the improvement. In fiscal year 2001, the board completed 
an average of 2,649 cases per month.41 After the reforms, in fiscal year 
2003, the board had increased its average to 4,314 cases per month.42 
This improved efficiency enabled the BIA to reduce the backlog 
of older cases progressively. When the Department of Justice 
announced the reforms in February 2002, the number of pending 
cases was 57,949. Of these, 38,843 were more than a year old. And 
13,707 were more than three years old.43 By May 2003, the number of 
pending cases was down to just over thirty-eight thousand. Of these, 
10,117 were more than a year old. And only 1,521 were more than 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/Summary-Conclusion_DorseyABAStudy.pdf 
(summarizing the results of the full report, infra note 40). 
 40. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD 
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO ENHANCE CASE MANAGEMENT 40 
(2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf. 
 41. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,878 (presenting data that in fiscal year 2001, the Board decided 
31,789 cases). 
 42. This information is from Department of Justice statistics in the possession of the 
authors. 
 43. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
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three years old. Thus, the backlog of cases more than a year old had 
been reduced by more than twenty-eight thousand in fifteen months.44 
By 2006, the BIA would eliminate the backlog entirely, resolving the 
vast majority of cases within one year. In January 2006, the number of 
pending cases was down to approximately twenty-eight thousand.45 
This is the normal level that one would expect in a system that 
receives more than forty thousand new appeals per year and resolving 
all but the most extraordinary cases in less than twelve months.46 
III.  THE BIA STREAMLINING REFORMS: UNDEFEATED  
IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
The 2002 reforms, in combination with the earlier reforms of 
1999, prompted a volley of due process challenges in eleven U.S. 
circuit courts of appeals, all of which were decided in 2003 and 2004. 
The challenges were aided by amicus briefs submitted by 
organizations such as the American Immigration Law Foundation 
and the American Immigration Lawyers Association.47 Their 
concerted arguments, however, were met with no success. Every 
single one of these due process challenges was rejected. As a result, a 
stable and overwhelming consensus among the circuits emerged in an 
unusually short period of time. 
At the outset, it must be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
long held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not confer any right to appeal, even in criminal prosecutions.48 
As the Supreme Court held in Ross v. Moffitt,49 “[W]hile no one 
would agree that the State may simply dispense with the trial stage of 
proceedings without a criminal defendant’s consent, it is clear that the 
 
 44. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: BIA RESTRUCTURING AND STREAMLINING 
PROCEDURES 2 (2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/06/BIAStreamliningFactSheet030906. 
pdf. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Michael M. Hethmon, Tsunami Watch on the Coast of Bohemia: The BIA Streamlining 
Reforms and Judicial Review of Expulsion Orders, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 999, 1018–20, 1030 
(2006). 
 48. It is recognized, of course, that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
governs the procedures of the BIA and immigration courts, because those adjudicative bodies 
are part of the federal government. The Supreme Court, however, has not stated or suggested 
that the extent of those due process protections differs in any material way. 
 49. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
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State need not provide any appeal at all.”50 The same conclusion 
applies with respect to appellate review in the administrative process 
of immigration proceedings. As the Seventh Circuit put it: 
The Constitution does not entitle aliens to administrative appeals. 
Even litigants in the federal courts are not constitutionally entitled 
to multiple layers of review. The Attorney General could dispense 
with the Board [of Immigration Appeals] and delegate her powers 
to the immigration judges, or could give the Board discretion to 
choose which cases to review (a la the Appeals Council of the Social 
Security Administration, or the Supreme Court exercising its 
certiorari power). The combination of a reasoned decision by an 
administrative law judge plus review in a United States Court of 
Appeals satisfies constitutional requirements.51 
This basic principle has been reiterated by every circuit to consider 
the question. As the First Circuit put it, “An alien has no 
constitutional right to any administrative appeal at all.”52 The Third 
Circuit agreed.53 And the Tenth Circuit added, “Rather, the right to 
appeal is merely a regulatory creation of the Attorney General.”54 
The Eighth Circuit similarly opined: “[A]n alien has no constitutional 
or statutory right to an administrative appeal from the decision of an 
IJ.”55 Against this backdrop, any due process challenge to the BIA 
streamlining reforms of 1999 and 2002 was destined to be an uphill 
struggle. 
There were essentially three due process challenges that were 
leveled against the reforms. The first and most frequent challenge was 
to the BIA’s use of the AWO. The argument against the procedure 
 
 50. Id. at 611; see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (“[I]t is well settled 
that there is no constitutional right to an appeal.” (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 
(1894))); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion) (“[A] State is not required 
by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 51. Guentchev v. INS, 77 F.3d 1036, 1037–38 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 52. Kechichian v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Albathani v. INS, 318 
F.3d 365, 376 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
 53. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“The ‘right to meaningful 
review’ . . . is clearly distinguished from ‘the fundamental requirement of due process [that] is 
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner . . . .”). 
 54. Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1353 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 
F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004) (“We therefore agree with the analysis of Albathani and those 
other courts and join them in holding that the summary affirmance procedures do not violate 
principles of administrative law or due process.”). 
 55. Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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was that the issuance of the AWO denied the alien a meaningful 
explanation for the affirmance of the immigration court ruling and a 
sufficient basis on which to appeal to the Article III courts, thus 
denying the alien due process. The second challenge was that the 
AWO denied due process by denying the alien a sufficiently 
individualized determination on appeal. The third challenge was that 
a decision by a single member of the BIA, as opposed to a three-
member panel, did not provide a meaningful opportunity to appeal 
and therefore denied the alien due process. All three challenges have 
been rejected resoundingly. 
In 2003, the First Circuit, in Albathani v. INS,56 was the first to 
confront the question of whether the lack of explanation in an AWO 
denied an alien due process. The case involved a citizen of Lebanon 
who sought asylum on the basis that he was a Christian who feared 
persecution by members of Hezbollah in Lebanon.57 The immigration 
judge denied Albathani’s application for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture, finding Albathani’s story not credible.58 The BIA summarily 
affirmed the immigration judge’s decision by issuing an AWO.59 
Albathani appealed to the First Circuit, raising his due process claim. 
The First Circuit held that the lack of substantive explanation did 
not constitute a denial of due process: “The court thus reviews the 
BIA decision without knowing its basis. The summary affirmance 
scheme does create these problems, but they do not render the 
scheme a violation of due process or render judicial review 
impossible. Nor does the scheme violate any statute.”60 The court also 
reasoned that any “problem” was self-correcting: “In functional 
terms, if the BIA does not independently state a correct ground for 
affirmance in a case in which the reasoning proffered by the IJ is 
faulty, the BIA risks reversal on appeal.”61 Alternatively, the BIA 
might risk remand; the relevant circuit may conclude that the AWO 
and immigration judge’s opinion, combined, leave important 
questions unanswered. In these cases, the court may vacate the BIA’s 
dismissal of the alien’s appeal and remand with instructions to the 
 
 56. Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 57. Id. at 367. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 377. 
 61. Id. at 378. 
ASHCROFT IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:49:56 AM 
2002 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1991 
BIA to issue an opinion clarifying its reasons for dismissing the 
appeal.62 “In sum, the IJ’s decision provides the reasoned explanation 
for the agency’s decision, its existence enables [the court] to review 
the agency decision, and the BIA knows that faulty or inadequate 
reasoning in the IJ’s decision will lead to the reversal of a BIA 
summary affirmance of that decision.”63 
The First Circuit also noted that the U.S. courts of appeals utilize 
one-line decisions to dispose of appropriate cases: 
Courts themselves use ‘summary affirmance’ or ‘summary 
disposition’ procedures in which parties may receive one-line 
dispositions of their appeals. These are workload management 
devices that acknowledge the reality of high caseloads. They do not, 
either alone or in combination with caseload statistics, establish that 
the required review is not taking place.64 
Other circuits soon thereafter adopted the reasoning and 
conclusion of the First Circuit on the matter. The Fifth, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits all followed suit within a few months.65 The Ninth 
Circuit summarized the emerging consensus favorably and joined: 
“The First Circuit’s opinion in Albathani was the first to address the 
issue. Its careful reasoning is persuasive and, like the other courts of 
appeal that followed, we embrace its rationale.”66 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected the argument that the AWO limited the alien’s ability to 
seek review of the agency action in a U.S. court of appeals: 
Nor is it a due process violation for the BIA to affirm the IJ’s 
decision without issuing an opinion. The IJ’s decision becomes the 
final agency action when a case is streamlined. Thus, the 
streamlining procedures do not compromise our ability to review the 
INS’s decision, to the extent we have jurisdiction to do so, because 
we can review the IJ’s decision directly.67 
By effectively referring the court of appeals to the IJ decision, the 
AWO would not deny due process—just as a BIA opinion stating “we 
 
 62. See Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 63. Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 64. Albathani, 318 F.3d at 379 (citation omitted). 
 65. See Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2003); Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 
F.3d 830, 832 (5th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 66. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 67. Id. at 851 (citation omitted). 
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adopt the reasoning and analysis of the immigration judge” would not 
deny due process.68 
In December 2003, the Third Circuit—the only circuit to 
consider the question en banc—addressed the issue in Dia v. 
Ashcroft.69 The case involved a citizen of Guinea who had illegally 
entered the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture. Dia claimed that he would be persecuted in Guinea due to 
his political opinions.70 The immigration judge had rejected Dia’s 
claims, based on her conclusion that he was not credible, and the BIA 
summarily affirmed without opinion.71 In a lengthy opinion addressing 
every permutation of Dia’s due process claims, the Third Circuit 
opined: 
Neither the Constitution nor Congress guarantee a de novo review 
by the BIA nor do they guarantee a right to a fully reasoned opinion 
by the BIA. We are able to meaningfully review the final 
determination of the agency, and, in this context, that is all that due 
process requires.72 
The Third Circuit also noted the circumstances that had precipitated 
the streamlining reforms, pointing to the “crushing caseload, the 
number of cases having increased exponentially in a little over a 
decade.”73 
In the same month, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits concurred.74 A 
month later, in January 2004, the Tenth Circuit would join its sister 
circuits, repeating the observation that “a BIA summary affirmance is 
not unlike the summary affirmance or summary disposition 
procedures employed by courts, which are workload management 
devices that acknowledge the reality of high caseloads.”75 
 
 68. See Yuk, 355 F.3d at 1230. 
 69. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 70. Id. at 233–34. 
 71. Id. at 234. 
 72. Id. at 243 (citations omitted). 
 73. Id. at 235. 
 74. Loulou v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir. 2003); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 732 
(6th Cir. 2003). 
 75. Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1356 (10th Cir. 2004); Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 
1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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Finally, in March 2004, the Second and Fourth Circuits reached 
the same conclusion.76 The Second Circuit noted the uniformity with 
which its sister circuits had rejected similar due process challenges.77 
Neatly summarizing the conclusion of the other circuits, the court 
held: 
Our concern is whether streamlining deprives an alien of the process 
that he is due by law. Under applicable laws and regulations, even 
after streamlining, an applicant for asylum or withholding of 
removal remains entitled to a full hearing on his asylum claims, a 
reasoned opinion from the IJ, the opportunity for BIA review, and 
the right to seek relief from the courts. This is the process Zhang 
received.78 
The Second Circuit also mentioned in passing the complaint of some 
judges that the streamlining reforms of 1999 and 2002 had, by 
removing the logjam of cases, sent a surge of appeals to the circuits. 
The court brushed the issue aside as irrelevant: “Whether the 
streamlining regulations will or will not add to our burden, however, 
is not the issue before us.”79 Although the streamlining reforms had 
indeed increased the caseload of the U.S. courts of appeals, such an 
increase was inevitable if the backlog was ever to be resolved. 
The Fourth Circuit, the final circuit to rule on the question, 
reiterated that the AWO was similar to the summary affirmance 
procedures used by the U.S. courts of appeals. What was good for the 
goose was good for the gander. “The BIA summary affirmance 
procedures are not unlike summary disposition procedures routinely 
used by appellate courts to resolve cases which do not raise novel or 
complex questions and whose issues the lower court has adequately 
addressed.”80 And so the cascade of opinions ended. Within a 
thirteen-month period from February 2003 to March 2004, eleven 
circuits had arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the AWO did 
not violate due process. On very few questions have so many circuits 
come together so quickly. 
The second due process challenge—that an AWO denies the 
alien an individualized determination—was addressed by the Third 
 
 76. Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 281 (4th Cir. 2004); Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 77. Zhang, 362 F.3d at 156–57. 
 78. Id. at 159. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Blanco de Belbruno, 362 F.3d at 281. 
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Circuit in Dia. Dia seized upon a statement in an earlier Third Circuit 
opinion stating that an alien seeking relief from removal has the due 
process right to “‘an individualized determination of his [or her] 
interests.’”81 Dia combined this statement with language from another 
Third Circuit opinion suggesting that “the BIA denies due process to 
an alien when it ‘acts as a mere rubber-stamp.’”82 Dia maintained that 
the boilerplate statement of an AWO was therefore a denial of an 
individualized determination.83 The Third Circuit rejected the 
argument, distinguishing its earlier statements as applying to a case in 
which the BIA had chosen to speak and present its own rationale for 
its decision. “The situation here is very different; the BIA did not 
opine on its own, but, instead, referred us to the IJ’s decision.”84 This 
distinction may not have been entirely persuasive as a means of 
extricating the court from its prior language, but the court’s 
conclusion certainly was: 
Dia, nonetheless, also insists that the streamlining regulations 
violate his right to an “individualized determination” because they 
specifically state that an AWO does not necessarily imply approval 
of all of the reasoning of the IJ’s decision. But he fails to articulate 
why or how this is so. We are unaware of any requirement, let alone 
any constitutional requirement, that an agency adjudicator must 
commit to writing or otherwise verbalize his or her reasoning, 
where, as here, the agency has directed us to an opinion for review. 
In Dia’s case, the due process right to an “individualized 
determination” was accorded to Dia at the IJ level, where the IJ 
“reasoned” her decision, and the BIA gave the result its imprimatur 
pursuant to its regulations. Certainly, the BIA could have 
articulated its reasons for affirming the IJ’s order, but just because it 
had the power to do so, does not mean the Constitution required it 
to exercise that power.85 
Thus, the BIA’s use of standardized language in issuing an AWO did 
not deny due process.86 
 
 81. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 
(10th Cir. 1994))). 
 82. Id. (quoting Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 550 (quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 202 n.7 
(3d Cir. 1996))). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 240. 
 85. Id. (citation omitted). 
 86. See id. 
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The third due process challenge—that due process requires an 
appeal to a three-member panel rather than a single member of the 
BIA—has also been presented less frequently. Its rejection, however, 
has been equally emphatic in the three circuits that have addressed it. 
The argument was presented to the Ninth Circuit in Falcon Carriche 
v. Ashcroft,87 a case involving citizens of Mexico whose request for 
cancellation of removal was denied.88 The immigration judge rejected 
the Falcon Carriches’ claim that their U.S. citizen daughter would 
suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if the family 
were removed to Mexico because the daughter would have difficulty 
adapting to the Mexican educational system and because the family 
would face economic difficulty in providing for her. The immigration 
judge found that any difficulties the daughter would face were neither 
exceptional nor unusual.89 A single member of the BIA affirmed the 
immigration judge’s opinion via AWO.90 The Falcon Carriches 
maintained that review by a three-member panel of the BIA 
constituted “an additional procedural safeguard” necessary to ensure 
due process.91 The Ninth Circuit disagreed: 
Their assertion that “it takes at least three board members to 
identify, shape and determine important issues” in every appeal 
finds no support in the law. Nor is there any support for their 
assertion that a single board member will not conduct the required 
review of the IJ’s decision. The Carriches received all of the 
administrative appeals to which they were entitled by statute and the 
Constitution does not require that the BIA do more.92 
The court also went on to point out that the aliens still possessed, and 
were exercising, their right to seek review before a U.S. court of 
appeals—which rendered their claim of inadequate appellate review 
hollow.93 The Ninth Circuit concluded by reiterating the Supreme 
Court’s statement that “administrative agencies should be free to 
fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of 
 
 87. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 88. Id. at 848. 
 89. Id. The “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” criterion is found in 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006). 
 90. Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 845. 
 91. Id. at 850. 
 92. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 376 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
 93. Id. 
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inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous 
duties.”94 
The Fourth Circuit also disposed of the notion that a magic 
number of three judges was required to meet the requirements of due 
process: 
Belbruno also claims a due process violation, because a single BIA 
member, rather than a three-member panel, decided her appeal. She 
claims the resolution of her appeal by a single person resulted in a 
greater chance of an inaccurate and constitutionally impermissible 
result. But there is no magic—and certainly no due process 
implications—in any given number of reviewing judges. What 
matters is that Belbruno was able to take the decision of the 
Immigration Judge to an authority with the responsibility to 
overturn an erroneous decision. And, of course, Belbruno both 
possessed and exercised the right to appeal the agency decision to a 
panel of this court whose members, coincidentally, are three in 
number.95 
The court wisely declined to accept the invitation to hold that due 
process required a particular number of appellate judges to guarantee 
a certain probability of reversal.96 
The Third Circuit entertained the same due process argument, 
phrased as a contention that the single-member review procedure was 
unfair to the alien.97 The en banc panel rejected this claim: 
We find nothing “unfair” in a constitutional sense about the INS’s 
streamlining procedures. An applicant retains a full and fair 
opportunity to make his case to the IJ, and has a right to review of 
that decision by the BIA, and then by a court of appeals. The fact 
that the review is done by one member of the BIA and that the 
decision is not accompanied by a fully reasoned BIA decision may 
be less desirable from the petitioner’s point of view, but it does not 
make the process constitutionally “unfair.”98 
The court’s conclusion is hardly surprising. To hold otherwise would 
be to interpret the Due Process Clause as requiring an appellate body 
of a minimum size—a difficult conclusion to reach when the Supreme 
 
 94. Id. (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978)). 
 95. Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 282 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 96. Id. at 283. 
 97. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 243 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 98. Id. at 243–44 (citations omitted). 
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Court has held that no appeal at all is necessary to satisfy the 
requirements of due process. 
In sum, there has been an unusual degree of unity among the 
circuits that the BIA reforms of 1999 and 2002 do not deprive an alien 
of due process in any way. The only divergence that has emerged 
among the circuits is not on the due process question, but on the 
tangential question of whether the courts of appeals possess 
jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act to review 
whether the BIA properly followed federal regulations in deciding to 
use the AWO procedure in a particular case. The First,99 Third,100 and 
Ninth101 Circuits have held that they do possess jurisdiction to assess 
whether the AWO procedure is appropriate in a given case, whereas 
the Eighth102 and Tenth103 Circuits have held that they are without 
jurisdiction to do so.104 In any event, this circuit split is largely 
irrelevant to the due process issue. 
IV.  MORE ACCURATE APPELLATE ADJUDICATION 
A final argument made by critics of the 1999 and 2002 BIA 
reforms is that the BIA reversed a lower percentage of immigration 
judge opinions after the reforms than it did before the reforms.105 This 
argument was actually presented to the Fourth Circuit, which had 
little use for it. In the words of Judge Wilkinson, “Such statistics 
prove little, however. We have no idea what the optimal rate of 
affirmance or reversal of Immigration Judge decisions is, if such an 
optimal rate even exists. And [the petitioner] has made no showing 
that the BIA has failed to conduct the necessary review.”106 If there 
were an objectively correct percentage of reversals that the BIA 
should aspire to, such an argument might have merit; but no such 
target exists. 
Indeed, a stronger argument could be made that, prior to the 
2002 reforms, the BIA was more prone to producing inaccurate 
 
 99. Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 100. Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 101. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 102. Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 103. Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1355–56 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 104. See Jessica R. Hertz, Comment, Appellate Jurisdiction over the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’s Affirmance Without Opinion Procedure, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1019, 1019–20 (2006) 
(discussing the circuit split and arguing that jurisdiction should exist). 
 105. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 40, at 40. 
 106. Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 282 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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results by engaging in de novo review of factual findings based on the 
reading of cold transcripts. It is difficult to deny that an immigration 
judge is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of an alien 
testifying before him than a BIA member reading the transcript years 
after the words were uttered. The 2002 reforms appropriately 
recognized the immigration judge as the primary factfinder in 
immigration proceedings. 
One possible method of assessing the accuracy of BIA rulings is 
to look at the percentage of BIA decisions that are reversed by the 
U.S. courts of appeals. Of course, this method assumes that circuit 
judges are in the best position to determine the factual accuracy of 
results in immigration decisions, which may or may not be the case. 
At any rate, the Department of Justice considered this metric in 2006 
and found that “the affirmance and reversal (or remand) rates of BIA 
decisions have not changed significantly in the wake of the [2002] 
restructuring regulation. The vast majority of BIA decisions—more 
than 90 percent—continue to be affirmed in federal court.”107 This 
suggests that the factual accuracy of BIA decisionmaking remained 
the same after the reforms as it had been before the reforms. In any 
event, there is no compelling evidence indicating that the reforms 
reduced the accuracy of the BIA’s adjudicative process. And if a 
massive improvement in efficiency was achieved with no cost 
whatsoever in accuracy—and more likely with an improvement in 
accuracy in those cases in which the BIA would have otherwise 
engaged in de novo review of factual finding—then the BIA 
streamlining reforms were a profound success. 
CONCLUSION 
The story of the BIA streamlining reforms of 1999 and 2002 is 
essentially the recurring story of balancing the public’s need for 
efficient, accurate, and timely administration of justice against the 
individual’s desire to maximize procedural protections and the 
number of layers of appellate review. In the landmark due process 
case of Mathews v. Eldridge108 the Supreme Court conceived of due 
process in similar terms: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
 
 107. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 2. 
 108. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.109 
It is always possible, at least in theory, to add another layer of review 
to any adjudicative process. And it is similarly possible to add 
multiple adjudicators to the layer of review and to free the reviewing 
body from the constraints of deference to the lower court. But doing 
so exacts a public cost; and it is far from clear that doing so results in 
greater accuracy of decisionmaking. In other words, the Mathews 
Court contemplated that due process must encompass the procedural 
demands of society as well as the procedural demands of the 
individual.110 
It bears mentioning that an alien in removal proceedings still 
enjoys more layers of review than does a U.S. citizen in federal 
criminal or civil proceedings. An alien enjoys three layers of 
administrative review (immigration judge, BIA, and potentially the 
review of the attorney general), plus two layers of judicial review 
(U.S. court of appeals and potentially the review of the U.S. Supreme 
Court). In contrast, a citizen only enjoys three layers of review in 
federal proceedings (U.S. district court, U.S. court of appeals, and 
potentially the review of the U.S. Supreme Court). Yet no serious 
person would claim that such federal proceedings constitute a denial 
of due process for lack of appellate review. 
It is often said that justice delayed is justice denied. That 
aphorism is certainly true in most criminal proceedings. It is even 
more pertinent, however, in immigration proceedings. This is because 
in immigration cases, time is the primary objective. In just about every 
removal hearing, what the alien seeks, fundamentally, is more time in 
the United States. Conversely, what the government seeks in most 
immigration cases is to remove the alien from the United States 
sooner rather than later. Therefore, to provide an alien whose appeal 
lacks merit more time in the United States simply because of an 
 
 109. Id. at 335. 
 110. Id. at 334 (“Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures 
provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private 
interests that are affected.”). 
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unnecessary backlog at the BIA is to deny justice. Or to put it 
differently, the more expeditious resolution of immigration cases is a 
win-win proposition in terms of justice. If the alien will be the 
prevailing party, he or she is better off receiving vindication quickly. 
This is particularly true if the alien is detained during the immigration 
proceedings. On the other hand, if the government will be the 
prevailing party, the country is plainly better off if that determination 
is reached sooner. Every additional day that the ultimately removable 
alien spends in the United States because of unnecessary delay in the 
system is a denial of justice. 
Which brings us back to the crisis of backlogged cases that 
necessitated the BIA reforms in the first place. There is a weighty 
public interest in the administration of the immigration laws without 
unnecessary delay. When such delay reaches a point at which it 
creates a perverse incentive to file frivolous appeals, the system 
becomes unsustainable. This was where the immigration court system 
was in February 2002. By 2006, that unnecessary delay had been 
eliminated, with no loss of due process and with no loss of accuracy in 
decisionmaking. A more perfect system had been achieved. 
 
